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CASS  R. SUNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
To many  contemporary observers,  the ratification  of the American
Constitution marked the end  of classical  politics and the start of a  dis-
tinctive modern  approach.'  On that approach,  government takes people
as  they are.  Above  all,  it is respectful  of divergent  conceptions of the
good life.  Recognizing that self-interest  is often the basis of political be-
havior, it creates institutional arrangements  and  substantive rights  that
will discipline  likely abuses of political power, increase the prospects for
compromise, and create spheres of private autonomy into which govern-
ment  may not enter.  Agnostic about the good, a modern polity  creates
the basic rules by which people can order their private affairs.  Its ambi-
tions are otherwise quite modest.
This approach  is often  contrasted  with another  set of understand-
ings, sometimes  denominated  "republican."  For republicans,  the polity
is  supposed  to  benefit  from  and to inculcate  civic  virtue  in  its  people.
The character  of both the individual and the collectivity, and the enjoy-
ment of the good life, properly conceived,  are self-conscious concerns  of
the  system.  From  the  standpoint  of modern  observers,  such  systems
threaten totalism, or the imposition of a "comprehensive  view'"2 on the
population.  On the republican account,  however, collective  engagement
with individual  character and the good life  are crucial parts of politics.
Republicans also put a high premium on active citizen participation
in  public  affairs.  The  classical  republicans  placed  little  reliance  on the
*  Karl N. Llewellyn  Professor of Jurisprudence,  University of Chicago Law  School and  De-
partment  of Political  Science.  Some  of the  arguments  in this  essay  are  also set  out  in Sunstein,
Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB.  AFF.  3 (Winter  1991)  and  in C. Sunstein,  AFTER  THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  RECONCEIVING  THE REGULATORY  STATE  (Harvard University Press 1990).
I  am  grateful  to  George  Loewenstein,  Jane  Mansbridge,  and  Frederick  Schauer  for  helpful
comments.
1.  See  G.  WOOD,  THE CREATION  OF THE  AMERICAN  REPUBLIC (1972);  T. PANGLE,  THE
SPIRIT OF  MODERN  REPUBLICANISM  (1988);  Diamond,  Ethics and Politics" The American Way,  in
THE MORAL  FOUNDATIONS  OF THE  AMERICAN  REPUBLIC  (R. Horowitz  ed.  1979).
As the discussion below  should make clear,  I do not by any means intend to endorse all of the
details of this account.  There is reason to question both the picture of "classical  republicanism"  and
the claims  about the nature  of the shift  in  America.  But  these issues raise  questions  beyond  the
scope  of the present discussion.
2.  See  Rawls,  The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRD  J. LEGAL  STUD.  1 (1987).CHICAGO-KENT  LAW  REVIEW
protection  of "rights"  against the government.  Indeed, these  very cate-
gories would  seem a bit puzzling to the classical  tradition.
The division between  classical  republicans and the American fram-
ers  should not  be drawn  too  sharply.  The framers  of the  Constitution
drew  a considerable amount  from classical  republicanism,  especially in-
sofar  as  they placed  a high  premium  on  political  deliberation,  political
virtue, political  debate, and citizenship.  Madison and Hamilton in par-
ticular emphasized  the need for deliberation  among the differently  situ-
ated.  The basic institutions  of representation,  checks and balances, and
federalism  are best understood  against  this background.  Even  the indi-
vidual  rights safeguarded  by  the Constitution-the  right to a jury  trial
and  the  rights  of  assembly  and  petition,  for  example-owe  a  large
amount  to  the republican  tradition.  The  framers  were  hardly  interest-
group pluralists,  welfare economists, or believers in a prepolitical sphere
of private  rights.  They were  republicans,  albeit of a novel  stripe;  they
were liberals  as well.3
The conventional  division between the American founders and their
classical  predecessors  is  therefore  far too crude.  But  there  is certainly
something to the traditional view.  Respect for private preferences, rather
than collective  deliberation  about character,  public values,  or the good
life, seems to be a distinguishing feature of American constitutionalism.
It  is  here,  perhaps  especially  in  recent  years,  that the  classical  legacy
seems most remote and least accessible to modern  democratic theory and
contemporary  constitutional practice.
In this essay I want to explore the question whether a contemporary
democracy might not do better to concern itself directly with some of the
concerns  of republicanism.  It is one thing to  affirm  competing  concep-
tions of the good;  it is quite another to suggest that private preferences
should always be  off-limits  to politics.  My  goal  is  to see  how  a  demo-
cratic republic,  recognizing  the  value  and  even  the inevitability  of the
American abandonment of classical republicanism, might nonetheless at-
tempt to take advantage  of those aspects of republicanism  that have the
strongest  claim  to contemporary  support.  A  large  part of my concern
here is the phenomenon of endogenous  preferences,  a phenomenon  that
casts doubt on the idea that private desires  and beliefs ought to be pro-
3.  Indeed, participants in the  liberal tradition,  in its classical  forms, emphasized  the need  for
deliberation  in  government  and placed  a high  value  on political  virtue.  Many liberals  do not take
private preferences  for granted, whatever their sources and consequences, and whatever the reasons
that might  be offered in  their support.  See  Sunstein, Beyond  the Republican  Revival,  97 YALE  L.J.
1539  (1988).
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tected  in all contexts.
4
The  argument  is divided  in  three parts.  In  Part  I,  I  invoke  some
fairly  conventional  ideas about welfare and  autonomy in  order to draw
into doubt the claim  that government should base social choices on pri-
vate preferences.  In Part II, I set out three categories  of cases in which
private preferences,  as expressed in consumption choices, should be over-
come.  The first, directly  traceable to republican commitments, includes
collective desires,  including considered  social judgments and widely held
aspirations;  the second,  also with republican  roots, involves  preferences
that have adapted to unjust background conditions or undue limitations
in available opportunities; the third, building on classical ideas of myopia
or akrasia,  includes intrapersonal  collective active problems that, over a
lifetime,  decrease  personal  welfare.  A  democratic  republic,  I  argue,
should override private preferences  in  all of these cases.  In Part  III, I
draw on the republican tradition to deal with two current controversial
issues:  government  efforts  to promote  access  to the media  and propor-
tional representation.
I.  PREFERENCES,  DELIBERATION,  AND  POLrrIcs
Should a constitutional  republic take preferences  as given?  In con-
temporary  politics, law, and economics, the usual answer  is affirmative.
Modern  economics, for example, is dominated by a conception of welfare
based  on  the  satisfaction  of  existing  preferences;  in  politics  and  law,
something  called "paternalism"  is disfavored  in both the public and pri-
vate realms.5  But the idea that government ought to take preferences as
4.  On the limits of preference-based  theories, see Sen, Rational Fools" A  Critique  of the Behav-
ioral  Foundations  of Welfare Economics, 6 PHIL. & PUB.  AFP.  317  (1976); J. ELSTER,  SOUR  GRAPES
(1983);  Roemer,  "Rational  Choice"  Marxism,  in ANALYTICAL  MARXISM  (J. Roemer  ed.  1986).
It might well  be  that literature,  in addition  to economics  and political  theory,  is fruitful  for
exploring this subject.  See M. NUSSBAUM,  LOVE'S  KNOWLEDGE (1990);  Nussbaum, Shame. Sepa-
rateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, in ESSAYS  ON  ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS (A.
Rorty  ed.  1980)  [hereinafter  Nussbaum,  Shame. Separateness, and Political Unity].  It is  thus  no
accident that writers in politics and economics sometimes  draw on literature.  See,  e.g., J. ELSTER,
supra.
5.  There are of course criticisms within  all of these fields.  In economics, see Sen, supra  note 4.
In politics,  see  J. ELSTER, supra note  4.  See, on the legal  issues, Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CH.  L.  REV.  1129  (1986).
It is notable that the great expositors of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are
emphatic in their rejection  of the  view that existing  preferences  should be  taken as given,  for pur-
poses  of ethics  or politics.  See  J. MILL,  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT
(1861);  J. MILL,  THE SuBJEcToN OF  WOMEN  (1869);  J. RAwLs,  A  THEORY  OF JUSTICE  (1971).
Mill's rejection of that view is especially emphatic in his essay on Bentham,  when he criticizes  Ben-
tham for the view that "[t]o say  either that man should, or that he should not, take pleasure in one
thing, displeasure in another, appeared to him as much an act of despotism  in the moralist as in the
political  ruler."  J.  MILL,  MILL  ON  BENTHAM  AND  COLERIDGE  68  (F.R. Leavis  ed.  1950).  By
contrast, Mill emphasized the need to explore the influences "on the regulation of...  affections and
1990]CHICAGO-KENT  LAW  REVIEW
they are is a quite modem  one.  To say this is hardly to say that the idea
is  without  foundations.  Partly  a  function  of  the  perceived  (though
greatly overstated) difficulty of making interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity, it is also a product of the epistemological  difficulties in assessing pref-
erences  in  terms  of their  true connection  with individual  welfare,  and,
perhaps most of all, the genuine political dangers of allowing government
to engage  in such inquiries.
Notwithstanding  these  considerations,  an  initial  objection  to  the
view  that government  should  take  preferences  as  they are  might  point
out that whether people have a preference  for  a commodity,  a right, or
anything  else  is in part a function of whether  the government  has allo-
cated it to them in the first instance.  The decision to grant a right to one
person frequently makes that person value that right more than he would
if the  right had  been  allocated  to someone  else.  The  initial  allocation
serves  to  reflect,  to legitimate,  and  to  reinforce  social  understandings
about presumptive  rights of ownership,  and that allocation  has a causal
connection to individual perceptions about the good or right in question.
For example,  a  decision to  give  employees  a right  to  organize,  or
women a right not to be subject  to sexual harassment, will have  an im-
pact  on  social  attitudes  toward  labor  organization  and  sexual  harass-
ment.  The allocation  therefore has an  effect on  social  attitudes toward
the relevant  rights and  on  their valuation  by both  current  owners  and
would-be purchasers. And when preferences  are a function of legal rules,
the rules cannot, without circularity,  be justified by reference to the pref-
erences. 6  Because of the preference-shaping  effects of the rules of alloca-
tion,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  a  government  might  even  attempt  to  take
preferences  "as  given"  in any global sense.
To some degree this concern might be put to one side.  Surely there
is a difference between a government that concerns itself self-consciously
and on an ongoing basis with private preferences and a government that
sets up the basic rules of property, contract, and tort and then lets things
turn out  however they  may.  And  if this  distinction  can  be sustained,
disagreements about the relationship between politics and preferences ap-
desires," and rejected "the deficiencies  of a system of ethics which does not pretend to aid individuals
in the formation of their own character."  Id. at 70-71.  Of course there is a difference  between what
a  system  of ethics  and  what  a  system of politics should  say  about  that  question, as  Mill  clearly
indicated.
6.  See J. ELSTER,  supra note 4;  J. RAWiS,  supra note  5.  Compare the "endowment  effect"
discussed  in Thaler,  Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.  BEHAV.  & ORG.  39
(1980);  see also Knetsch & Sinden,  Willingess to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental
Evidence of  an Unexpected Disparity  in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON.  507 (1984); cf Nussbaum,
Shame, Separateness; and Political Unity, supra note 4.
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pear  to turn on  competing  notions  of autonomy  on the one  hand  and
welfare on the other.  Those who treat existing preferences  as sovereign
argue that this approach  is most likely to promote both individual free-
dom, rightly conceived,  and individual or social  welfare.
It will be useful to begin with welfare.  Even if one accepted a purely
welfarist  view,  one  might  think that the  process  of promoting  welfare
should take place, not by satisfying current preferences, but by  promot-
ing those preferences  and satisfying  them to such an extent as is conso-
nant with the best or highest conception of human happiness.  This view
is connected with older (and some current) forms of utilitarianism;  it also
has roots  in Aristotle.7  Here one  does not take existing preferences  as
given, and one does not put all preferences on the same plane.  A crite-
rion of welfare, at least in some sense, remains the ultimate one, but on
this view,  the system is not focused  solely on preference satisfaction.  Of
course a liberal  republic, respectful  as it should  be of the need  to limit
government and of divergent conceptions of the good, ought generally to
refrain from seeing private preferences as an object of collective  concern.
But the promotion of utility, rightly understood, does not always call for
satisfaction of existing preferences.
A central point here, highly  congenial to the republican tradition, is
that preferences  are  shifting  and  endogenous  rather  than exogenous-
endogenous to, or a function  of, current information, consumption  pat-
terns,  legal  rules,  and  social  pressures  most generally.  Because  prefer-
ences  are  shifting  and  endogenous,  and  because  the  satisfaction  of
existing preferences might lead to unhappy  or deprived lives, a political
system that treats all preferences as fixed will lose important opportuni-
ties for welfare  gains.  At  least if the relevant  cases  can be  confidently
identified in advance, and if collective action can be justified by reference
to particular good reasons, the argument for democratic interference  will
be quite powerful.  Respect for preferences that have resulted from unjust
background  conditions  and  that  will  lead  to  human  misery  appears
hardly the proper  course for a liberal republic.
For example,  legal  rules  prohibiting  or discouraging  addictive  be-
havior may have significant  advantages  in terms of welfare.  Regulation
of heroin or cigarettes-at least if the regulation can be made effective-
might well  increase  aggregate social welfare,  by  decreasing harmful be-
havior, removing  the secondary  effects  of those harms,  and producing
7.  For  a modem  utilitarian account  along  these  lines,  see  R. BRANDT,  A THEORY  OF  THE
GOOD AND  THE  RIGHT (198 1).  For an Aristotelian account,  see Sen,  Well-Being Agency, and Free-
dom,  82 J. PHIL. 169  (1985).
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more healthful and satisfying lives.  Or government regulation of the en-
vironment or broadcasting-encouraging  or requiring,  for example, pro-
tection of pristine areas, nonentertainment  broadcasting, or high-quality
programs--may  generate  (or, better, prevent  obstacles to generation  of)
new preferences,  providing increased satisfaction and in the end produc-
ing considerable  welfare  gains.  The same  may well  be true of antidis-
crimination  measures,  which  affect  the  desires  and  attitudes  of
discriminators and victims alike.  A system that takes private preferences
for granted  will sacrifice  large opportunities  for social  improvement  on
welfarist criteria.  This point was a crucial one in the early stages of utili-
tarian thought;  it has been lost more  recently with  the shift  from older
forms of welfarism  to the  idea of "revealed  preferences."
Moreover,  the  satisfaction  of private  preferences,  whatever  their
content and origins,  does not respond to a persuasive  conception  of lib-
erty or autonomy.  The notion of autonomy should refer instead to deci-
sions reached with a full and vivid awareness  of available  opportunities,
with  all relevant  information,  or, most  generally,  without  illegitimate
constraints  on the process of preference  formation.  When  these  condi-
tions are not met, decisions might be described  as unfree or nonautono-
mous.  If preferences  are a product of available  information, of existing
consumption patterns, of social pressures,  and of governmental  rules, it
seems odd to suggest that individual freedom lies exclusively or by defini-
tion  in  preference  satisfaction.  It seems  even  odder to suggest that  all
preferences  should  be  treated the  same,  independently  of their  origins
and consequences,  or of the reasons  offered in their support.
Consider, for example, a decision to purchase dangerous  foods, con-
sumer products, or cigarettes by  someone unaware of the serious  health
risks; an employer's decision not to deal with blacks because of the back-
ground  of public  and private segregation,  or racial hostility  in his com-
munity; a person  who disparages or has no interest in art and literature
because the culture in which he has been reared consists mostly of televi-
sion; a decision of a woman to adopt a traditional gender role because of
the social  stigma of refusing to do so;  a  decision  not to purchase  cars
equipped with seatbelts or not to wear motorcycle helmets because of the
social pressures imposed by  one's peer group;  a lack of interest in envi-
ronmental diversity  resulting from personal  experiences that are limited
to industrialized urban areas;  a decision not to employ blacks at a restau-
rant because  of fear  of violence  from whites.
These examples  are different  from one  another.  The  source of the
problem varies in each.  In all of them, however, the interest in liberty or
autonomy  does  not call for governmental  inaction, even if that were an
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intelligible category.  Indeed, in many of these cases regulation removes a
kind of coercion.
One goal of a democratic  republic,  in short, is to ensure autonomy
not only in the satisfaction of preferences, but also and more fundamen-
tally in the processes of preference formation.  Mill himself was emphatic
on this point, going so far as to suggest that government itself should be
evaluated by its effects on the character of the citizenry."  The view that
freedom requires an opportunity to choose among alternatives is supple-
mented by the view that people should not face unjustifiable  constraints
on the free development  of their preferences  and beliefs.  It  is not alto-
gether clear  what  such a view would require-a point to which we will
return.  At the very least, however,  it would  see a failure  of autonomy,
and a reason for collective response, in beliefs and preferences based  on
the absence  of information or on insufficient opportunities.
Government action might also be justified on grounds of autonomy
when  the public seeks  to implement, through democratic  processes  cul-
minating in law, widely held social aspirations or collective desires.  Indi-
vidual  consumption  choices  often  diverge  from  collective  considered
judgments:  people  may  seek,  through  law,  to implement a democratic
decision about what courses to pursue.  If so, it is ordinarily no violation
of autonomy  to  allow  those  considered judgments  to  be vindicated  by
governmental  action.  Consider a law calling for support of the arts or of
high-quality broadcasting, sought by a majority of the population at large
and making available opportunities  not provided  through market order-
ing.  Ideas  of this  sort  can be  connected  to  the  original  constitutional
belief, built on republican  foundations, in  deliberative  democracy.  Col-
lective aspirations or considered judgments, produced by a process of de-
liberation  in which competing perspectives  are brought to bear, reflect a
conception of political freedom  having deep  roots in the American  con-
stitutional tradition.
This  different  conception  of autonomy  places  an  emphasis  on  the
freedom  of collectivities  or communities-a  freedom embodied  in deci-
sions, reached by the citizenry, about what courses to pursue.  This view
is closely associated with classical republicanism, but it has resonances in
Madisonian  thought  as  well.  In  this  view,  political  autonomy  can  be
found in collective  self-determination,  as  citizens decide,  not what they
"want,"  but instead who they are-what their values are and what those
values  require.  What  they  "want"  must  be supported  by  reasons.  An
8.  See J.  MILL,  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT,  supra  note 5.
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important  form of freedom  consists  in precisely  these  processes  of self-
determination.
Of course  there  are  serious  risks  of overreaching  here,  and  there
must be some constraints-usually  denominated  "rights"--on  this pro-
cess.  Checks laid down in advance are an indispensable part of constitu-
tional  government.  Those  checks  will  include,  at  a  minimum,  basic
guarantees  of political  liberty  and  personal  security.  Such  guarantees
may  not be  compromised  by  processes  of collective  self-determination,
but  citizens  in  any  polity  would  be  likely  to  make  some  space  for
processes of this sort.
II.  REPUBLICAN  REJECTION OF  REVEALED  PREFERENCES
In this section I attempt to particularize the claims made above by
cataloging cases for democratic rejection of private preferences.  In all of
these  cases,  I  claim  that  participants  in  a liberal  republic  ought to be
concerned  with whether its citizens are experiencing  satisfying lives and
that  the  salutary  liberal  commitment  to divergent  conceptions  of  the
good ought not  always to be taken to  disable government from  expres-
sing that concern through  law.  The cases  fall in three basic categories:
collective desires, excessive limitations in opportunties, and intrapersonal
collective  action problems.
A.  Collective Desires and Aspirations
Citizens in a democratic polity might act to embody not the prefer-
ences  that they  hold  as  private  consumers,  but instead  what might  be
described  as collective  desires,  including aspirations,  "preferences  about
preferences,"  or considered judgments.  Measures of this sort are a prod-
uct of deliberative  processes on the  part of citizens  and representatives.
In those processes, at least sometimes people do not simply ask what they
"want."  Such measures cannot be understood as an attempt to aggregate
or trade-off private preferences.
1.  Politics, Markets,  and the Dependence  of Preferences  on Context
Frequently, political choices  cannot easily be  understood  as a pro-
cess of aggregating prepolitical  desires.  Some  people may, for example,
want  nonentertainment  broadcasting  on  television,  even  though  their
own consumption patterns favor situation comedies; they may seek strin-
gent laws protecting the environment or endangered species even though
they  do not use  the public  parks or  derive  benefits  from  protection  of
species;  they may approve of laws calling  for social security and welfare
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even  though they do not save or give to the poor; they may support  an-
tidiscrimination laws even though their own behavior  is hardly race- or
gender-neutral.  The choices people make as political participants are dif-
ferent from those  they make as consumers. Democracy  thus calls for an
intrusion on markets.
The  widespread  disjunction  between  political  and  consumption
choices presents something of a puzzle.  Indeed, it sometimes leads to the
view  that  market  ordering  is  undemocratic  and  that  choices  made
through the political process  are a preferable  basis for social  ordering.
A  generalization  of this sort would be  far too broad in light of the
multiple breakdowns of the political process and the advantages  of mar-
ket ordering  in  many arenas.  Respect  for private markets is  an impor-
tant  way  of respecting  divergent  conceptions  of the  good  and  is  thus
properly associated  with individual liberty.  Respect for markets is also
an engine of economic  productivity, an important individual and collec-
tive goal.  But it would be a mistake to suggest, as some do, that markets
always reflect individual choice more reliably than politics, or that demo-
cratic choices differ from consumption  outcomes only because  of confu-
sion, as voters fail to realize that they must ultimately bear the costs of
the programs  they favor.
Undoubtedly consumer behavior is sometimes a better or more real-
istic  reflection  of actual  preferences  than  is political  behavior.  But  in
light of the fact that preferences depend on context, the very notion of a
"better  reflection"  of a  unitary  "actual"  preference  is  a  confusing  one;
there is no such thing as an "actual"  (in the sense of acontextual) prefer-
ence  in these  settings.  Moreover,  the difference  might be explained  by
the fact  that political  behavior reflects  a  variety  of influences  that are
distinctive to the context of politics.
These influences include four closely related phenomena.  First, citi-
zens may seek to implement individual and collective aspirations in polit-
ical  behavior  but not  in  private  consumption.  As citizens,  people  may
seek the aid of the law to bring about a social state that they consider to
be in some sense higher than what  emerges from market ordering.  Sec-
ond, people may, in their  capacity as political actors,  attempt to satisfy
altruistic  or other-regarding  desires,  which  diverge  from  the  self-inter-
ested  preferences  characteristic  of markets.9  Third,  political  decisions
might  vindicate  what might be  called meta-preferences  or second-order
preferences.  People have wishes about their wishes,  and sometimes they
try  to  vindicate  those  second-order  wishes,  or  considered  judgments
9.  See  H.  MARGOLIS,  SELFISHNESS,  ALTRUISM,  AND  RATIONALITY  (1982).
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about what  is  best, through law. Fourth,  people  may precommit  them-
selves, in democratic  processes, to a course of action they consider to be
in the general interest;  the story of Ulysses and the  Sirens  is the model
here. The adoption of a Constitution is itself an example of a precommit-
ment strategy.
To  point to  these possibilities  is not  at all to deny  that market  or
private behavior frequently  reflects meta-preferences,  altruism, or aspira-
tions.  There  are countless  counterexamples  to any  such  claim.  Diver-
gences between market and  political behavior,  however, will  sometimes
be attributable to phenomena of this sort.
Consider, as a possible example of all these phenomena, the fact that
people  seem to want  regulation  designed  to secure high  quality  broad-
casting  even  though their  consumption  patterns  favor  situation  come-
dies-a fact that  helps justify certain  controversial  regulatory  decisions
by  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  requiring  nonentertain-
ment  broadcasting  and  presentations  on  issues  of  public  importance.
Consider  as  well  measures  designed  to protect  endangered  species  and
natural preserves  in the face of individual behavior that reflects little so-
licitude  for them.
2.  Explanations:  Collective  Action Problems,
Deliberation,  and Others
How  are the differences  between  choices expressed  in markets and
those  expressed  in  politics  to  be  explained?  There  are  a  number  of
possibilities.
First, the collective  character  of politics,  permitting a  response to
collective action  problems, is critical here.  People may not want to sat-
isfy their meta-preferences,  or to  be altruistic,  unless there  is assurance
that others  will  be bound  to do  so  as  well.  More simply,  people  may
prefer not to contribute to a collective benefit if donations are made indi-
vidually,  with no guarantee  that others  will participate;  but  their most
favored system, obtainable only or best through democratic  forms, might
be  one in  which  they contribute  if (but only  if) there  is assurance  that
others will do so.  Perhaps people feel ashamed if others are contributing
and  they are  not;  perhaps  they  feel  victimized  if they are contributing
and others are not.
In any  case, the satisfaction of aspirations,  altruistic goals, or meta-
preferences  will  sometimes  have  the  characteristics  of the  provision  of
public goods or the solution of prisoners' dilemmas.  Here, however, the
public good is an unconventional  one.  The need for government is not to
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satisfy private choices but instead to ensure the expression or satisfaction
of desires that, precisely because of the political setting, have a distinctive
character.  In a democratic society, government controls are an appropri-
ate response.
Second,  the  collective  character  of  politics  might  overcome  the
problem, discussed below, of preferences and beliefs that have adapted to
an unjust status quo or to limits in available opportunities.  Without the
possibility  of collective  action, the status quo may seem  intractable, and
private  behavior will adapt accordingly.  If, however,  people can  act in
concert, preferences  might take on a quite different  form.  Social move-
ments involving the environment, labor, and race and sex discrimination
are examples of this phenomenon.  Possible democratic responses include
recycling programs,  energy conservation programs, and contributions  to
the  arts, to  the  poor,  and to environmental  protection.  The  collective
action problem thus interacts with aspirations,  altruistic desires, second-
order preferences,  and precommitment  strategies.  All of these are more
likely to be  enacted into law in the face of collective action.
Third, social and cultural norms might incline people to express as-
pirational or altruistic goals more often in political behavior than in mar-
kets.  Such  norms may  press people, in their capacity  as citizens, in the
direction of a concern  for others or for the public  interest.
Fourth, the deliberative aspects of politics, bringing additional infor-
mation  and  perspectives  to  bear,  may  affect  preferences  as  expressed
through  governmental  processes.  A  principal  function  of a democratic
republic  is to ensure that through  representative  processes,  new or sub-
merged voices, or novel depictions of where interests lie and what they in
fact are, can be heard and understood.  It should hardly be surprising  if
preferences,  values, and perceptions of both individual and collective in-
terests are changed  as a result of that process.
Fifth, and finally,  consumption decisions are a product  of the crite-
rion of private  willingness  to pay, which  creates  distortions of its own.
Willingness to pay  is a function  of ability to pay, and it is an extremely
crude proxy for utility. Political behavior removes this distortion (which
is not to say that it does not introduce  distortions  of its own).
These  general  considerations  suggest  that  citizens  in  a  republic
might attempt to embody in law a considered judgment on their part that
the choices reflected in consumption  patterns ought to be overcome.  A
related but more narrow justification  is that statutes safeguard noncom-
modity values-like  environmental diversity-that  an unregulated mar-
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ket,  even  a  well-functioning  one,  might protect  inadequately. 1 0  Social
ordering  through  markets  may have  long-term,  world  transforming  ef-
fects that reflect collective myopia, an emphasis on short-term considera-
tions at the expense of the future.  Possible responses include promotion
of high quality programming in broadcasting, of the arts, and of diversity
through  protection of the environment and of endangered species.  In all
these respects, political  choices are not made by consulting given  or pri-
vate desires, but instead  reflect a deliberative  process designed  to shape
and reflect values.
3.  Qualifications:  Risks and Distortions
Arguments  from  collective  desires  are irresistible if the measure  at
issue is adopted unanimously.  But more serious difficulties are produced
if (as is usual) the law imposes on a minority what it regards as a burden
rather  than  a benefit.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  a  majority wants  to
require  high-quality  television  and  to  ban  violent  and  dehumanizing
shows, but that a significant minority wants to see  the latter.  If we put
the first  amendment  questions  aside  for  now,  it might still  be thought
that those who perceive  a need to bind themselves, or to express an aspi-
ration, should not be permitted to do so if the consequence  is to deprive
others of an opportunity  to satisfy their preferences.
The  foreclosure  of the preferences  of the  minority  is  unfortunate,
but in general it is hard to see  what argument there is for an across-the-
board rule against collective action of this sort.  If the majority is prohib-
ited from vindicating  its  second-order or  altruistic  preferences  through
legislation, its own desires will be frustrated.  The choice  is between the
preferences  of the  majority  and  those  of the  minority.  On  the  other
hand, the foreclosure of the minority probably  should be permitted only
when less restrictive alternatives, including private arrangements,  are un-
available  to serve the same end.
The  argument  for  democratic  outcomes  embodying  collective
desires is much weaker in three categories of cases.  First, if the particu-
lar choice foreclosed has some special character,  it is appropriately con-
sidered a right, and the majority has no authority to intervene.  Consider
political expression or participation; here the equal  rights of members of
the  minority must be respected  even if a general  aspiration, held by the
majority, argues for selective exclusions.  So too, other rights fundamen-
10.  See Stewart, Regulation  in a Liberal State:  The Role of Non-Commodity  Values,  92 YALE
L.J.  1537  (1983).
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tal to self-actualization  or self-realization---consider  intimate  sexual  ac-
tivity--ought generally  to be off-limits to government.
Second,  some collective desires  might be  objectionable  or distorted.
A  social  preference  against  racial  intermarriage  could  not plausibly  be
justified as reflecting an aspiration or a precommitment strategy.  To ex-
plain  why,  it is  of course  necessary  to  offer  an  independent  argument,
challenging  that preference  and  sounding  in justice.  But  the example
suggests  that the  mere fact  of a  collective  aspiration  is  insufficient  for
approval of foreclosure of private choice.  The aspiration itself must not
be objectionable  on moral grounds.
Third, some  collective  desires  might reflect  a special  weakness  on
the part of the  majority;  consider a curfew law, or perhaps  prohibition.
In such circumstances,  a legal remedy  might remove desirableincentives
for private self-control, have unintended side-effects  resulting from "bot-
tling up"  desires,  or prove  unnecessary  in light of the existence of alter-
native remedies.  When  any  of these  three  concerns  arise,  the  case  for
protection of collective desires is weakened.  In many contexts, however,
these  concerns  are  absent,  and  democratic  controls  initiated  on  these
grounds are justified.
4.  The Sometimes Strange  Idea of "Rent-seeking"
If the arguments presented  in this section are  persuasive, they sug-
gest reasons  to be  skeptical of some  normative  work in the tradition of
public choice theory.  According to at least some of this work, much of
the business of politics should be seen  as  "rent-seeking,"  understood  as
the  expenditure  of  funds  on  the  wasteful  redistribution  of  resources
through  politics  rather  than the  production  of resources  through mar-
kets.  The  notion of "rent-seeking"  rejects  nearly all of the basic work-
ings  of politics.  It treats  citizenship  itself as  an  evil.  Efforts  to  enact
public aspirations,  to counteract  discrimination,  to protect the environ-
ment-all  these are  seen  as  the  diversion of productive  energies  into  a
wasteful place.
This view represents a peculiar reversal of the liberal republican tra-
dition, which has seen political behavior not as an evil, but as an impor-
tant  arena  for  education,  for  deliberation  and  discussion  about  the
nation's direction, for the development  of the faculties, and for the culti-
vation of feelings of altruism. On all of these scores, the liberal republican
tradition remains extremely vibrant in the United States, and it continues
to describe a wide range of individual and collective behavior.  It would
of course be foolish to deny that much political conduct is an effort to use
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governmental power to  serve selfish ends and that the concept of "rent-
seeking"  can often help in understanding the governmental  process.  But
to collapse all political behavior into the category of "rent-seeking"  is to
devalue  grotesquely the  activities of citizenship.
B.  Excessive Limitations in Opportunities or Unjust
Background Conditions
Citizens in a democracy might override existing preferences in order
to foster and promote diverse experiences,  with a view toward providing
broad opportunities  for the formation of preferences  and beliefs, and  for
distance  on and critical scrutiny  of current  desires.  This  rationale  sup-
ports private ordering  and freedom of contract as  well.  But it calls  for
collective  safeguards  when  those forces  push  toward  homogeneity  and
uniformity, as they often do in industrialized nations.  Here the argument
for governmental  controls  finds  a  perhaps  ironic  origin  in Mill.  Such
controls are necessary to cultivate divergent conceptions of the good and
to ensure  a degree  of reflection  on those  conceptions.
One might describe a system that took this goal seriously as embod-
ying a mild form of liberal perfectionism.  Such a system would see the
inculcation of critical and disparate attitudes toward prevailing  concep-
tions of the good  as part of the framework  of a liberal  republic.  Liberal
education is of course the principal locus of this concern.  The principles
embodied in liberal education  need not be confined  to the school system.
Democratic  measures  with  respect  to  the arts  and broadcasting-
subsidizing public broadcasting,  ensuring a range  of disparate program-
ming, or calling  for high-quality  programming provided  only a little or
not at all by the marketplace--can  be understood in these terms.  Indeed,
the need to provide  diverse opportunities  for preference  formation  sug-
gests reasons to be quite skeptical of unrestricted  markets in communica-
tion and  broadcasting.  There  is a firm  theoretical  justification  for the
much-criticized,  and now  largely abandoned  "fairness  doctrine,"  which
required broadcasters to cover controversial issues and to ensure compet-
ing views.  In light of the inevitable effects of programming on character,
beliefs, and even conduct, it is hardly clear that governmental "inaction"
is always appropriate  in a constitutional  democracy;  indeed the contrary
seems true.  (I  take up this issue  in more detail below.)
Moreover,  market  behavior  is sometimes  based  on  an  effort  to re-
duce  cognitive  dissonance  by  adjusting  to  undue  limitations  in  current
practices  and  opportunities.  When  this  is  so,  respect  for  preferences
seems unjustified  on grounds of autonomy  and perhaps  welfare  as well.
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In  these  circumstances,  preferences  are nonautonomous  insofar as  they
are reflexively  adaptive" 1  to unjust background conditions;  collective re-
sponses to such preferences might yield welfare gains as well.  The point
has large  implications.  For  example, workers  appear  to underestimate
the risks of hazardous  activity partly in order to reduce the  dissonance
that would be  produced  by an understanding  of the  real dangers  of the
workplace.1 2  Democratic controls might produce  gains in terms of both
welfare  and autonomy.
Similar ideas help  account  for antidiscrimination  principles.  Most
generally, the beliefs of both beneficiaries and victims of existing injustice
are  affected  by  dissonance-reducing  strategies.1 3  The  phenomenon  of
blaming the victim has distinct cognitive  and motivational foundations.
A central point here is that the strategy of blaming the victim, or assum-
ing that an  injury  or an  inequality  was  deserved or inevitable,  tends to
permit  nonvictims  or  members  of advantaged  groups  to  reduce  disso-
nance  by  assuming  that  the  world  is just-a pervasive,  insistent,  and
sometimes  irrationally  held belief.' 4  The  reduction  of cognitive  disso-
nance  is  a  powerful  motivational  force,  and it  operates  as  a significant
obstacle to the recognition  of social injustice  or irrationality.
Victims also participate in dissonance-reducing strategies, including
the lowering of self-esteem to accommodate both the fact of victimization
and  the belief that the world  is  essentially just.  Sometimes  it appears
easier to assume  that one's  suffering  is warranted  than to believe it has
been imposed cruelly or by mere chance.  Consider here the astonishing
fact that after a draft lottery, those with both favorable  and unfavorable
results decided that the outcomes of the purely random process were de-
11.  There is a difference between  self-conscious adaptation to an intractable status quo and the
sorts of processes I am describing.  If a person without musical talent decides that he will counteract
and revise his desire to be a world-famous pianist, it would be odd to find that (healthy) decision to
be  inconsistent  with personal  autonomy.  The  cases  under  discussion  involve  a  reflexive  process
based on an absence, socially produced, of sufficient opportunities.  Of course the notion of sufficient
opportunities itself requires  a baseline;  every system contains limited opportunities.
12.  See  Akerlof  & Dickens,  The  Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72  Am.
ECON.  REv.  307 (1982).
13.  On  cognitive  dissonance,  see  L.  FESTINGER,  A  THEORY  OF  COGNITIVE  DISSONANCE
(1957);  on  its implications  for  social  theory,  welfare, and  autonomy,  see  J. ELsTER,  supra note 4.
See  also M.  WOLLsToNEcRAFT,  A  VINDICATION  OF  THE RIGHTS  OF WOMEN  (1792),  which
can  be seen as an extended discussion of the social formation of preferences  and the phenomenon of
the  adaptation  of preferences,  beliefs,  and  desires  to an  unjust  status  quo.  Thus  Wostonecraft
writes,  "I  will  venture to  affirm, that  a girl,  whose spirits  have not been  damped by  inactivity, or
innocence  tainted  by false shame,  will  always be a  romp, and  the  doll  will never  excite  attention
unless  confinement  allows her no alternative."  Id.  at 43.  Similar points are made  in J. MILL,  THE
SUBJECTION  OF WOMEN, supra note 5,  as against the claim that the existing desires of women are a
product  of consent.
14.  See  M.  LERNER,  THE BELIEF  IN  A  JUST WORLD:  A  FUNDAMENTAL  DELUSION  (1980).
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served.' 5  The phenomenon of blaming the victim also reflects the "hind-
sight effect,"  through which people unjustifiably perceive events as more
predictable than they in fact were, and therefore suggest that victims or
disadvantaged groups should have been able to prevent the negative out-
come.  All this makes reliance on existing or revealed preferences  highly
problematic in certain contexts.
There  is suggestive  evidence  in  the psychological  literature  to  this
effect.  Some work here reveals that people who engage in cruel behavior
change  their attitudes  toward  the  objects  of their  cruelty  and thus de-
value  them;  observers  tend  to  do the same.16  Such evidence  bears  on
antidiscrimination  law in general.  Aspects  of American  labor and race
discrimination law can be understood as a response to the basic problem
of distorted beliefs and preferences.  7  There are implications here for sex
discrimination as well.  The movement for the elimination of sex discrim-
ination  is informed  by an understanding  that many women-as well as
many men-have adapted to an  unjust status quo.
Sometimes, moreover, preferences are only imperfectly adapted.  At
some level there is a perception of an injury, but a fear of social sanctions
or a belief that the cause  is intractable  prevents  people from seeking re-
dress.  Here the collective character of politics, permitting  the organiza-
tion of numerous  people, can be exceedingly  helpful.
Standing by itself, the fact that preferences are shifting and endoge-
nous  is  hardly  a sufficient  reason  for democratic  controls.  All  prefer-
ences  are  to  some  degree  dependent  on  existing  law  and  current
opportunities,  and  that  fact  cannot  be  a  reason  for government  action
without  creating  a  license  for  tyranny.  The argument  for  democratic
controls in the face of endogenous  preferences  must rely on a belief that
welfare or autonomy  will thereby be promoted.  Usually, of course, gov-
ernmental interference  should be avoided.  Too often, however, the salu-
tary belief in respect for divergent conceptions of the good is transformed
into  an unwillingness  to  protect people  from unjust  background  condi-
tions or a sheer lack of options.
The actual content of democratic controls will be controversial, and
it probably should begin and usually end with efforts to provide informa-
tion  and to  increase  opportunities.  Thus,  for example,  governmentally
required  disclosure of risks in the  workplace  is a highly  plausible strat-
15.  Rubin  & Peplau, Belief in a Just World and Reaction to Another's Lot: A Study of Partici-
pants in the National Draft Lottery, 29  J. Soc.  IssuEs,  73,  84-85  (1973).
16.  See M.  LERNER, supra note  14.
17.  See  Gewirtz, Choice in the  Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
COLUM.  L. REv.  728  (1986).
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egy.  In a few cases, however, these milder strategies may be inadequate,
and coercion  is necessary.
The category of democratic responses  to endogenous  preferences of
this sort overlaps with that of measures that attempt to protect collective
aspirations.  Frequently  aspirations  might form  the basis  for  laws that
attempt to influence  processes of preference  formation.
C.  Intrapersonal  Collective Action Problems
There is  also a case  for democratic controls on existing preferences
when  such preferences  are a  function  of past acts of consumption  and
when such acts alter desires or beliefs in such a way as to cause long-term
harm.  Here  the purpose  of collective  controls  is  to affect  the develop-
ment  of certain  preferences.  Preferences  are endogenous  not to existing
legal rules or to limited opportunities but to past consumption decisions,
and in the cases at hand, the effect of those decisions on current prefer-
ences is pernicious.  For government to act in this context, it is important
that it be confident of its conclusions.  An absence  of information on the
part of the  private actors  is usually  a necessary  condition for  collective
controls.
Regulation of addictive substances, of myopia, and of habits are fa-
miliar  examples.  In the case  of an  addiction,  the problem  is  that  the
costs of nonconsumption  increase dramatically over time, as the benefits
of consumption  remain  constant  or fall sharply.  The  result  is that the
aggregate costs,  over time or over a life, of consumption exceed  the ag-
gregate  benefits,  even  though  the  initial  consumption  choice  provides
benefits  that exceed  costs.  Individual  behavior  that  is rational  for each
individual consumption  choice  ultimately  leads  people into severely  in-
ferior social states.  In such cases, people,  if fully informed, would in all
likelihood not want to become involved with  the good  in the first place.
Government  action is  a possible response.
Menachem  Yaari offers the example of a group of traders attempt-
ing  to induce  alcoholism  in  an  Indian  tribe.18  At  the  outset  alcoholic
beverages are not extremely  valuable to consumers.  The consumers are
willing to buy only for a low price, which the traders willingly offer.  But
as a result of past consumption, the value of the beverages to the consum-
ers  steadily  increases,  to the  point where  they  are  willing to pay enor-
mous sums to obtain them.  Thus the traders are able:
to  manoeuvre  the  Indian  into  a  position  where  rationality  conflicts
18.  Yaari, Endogenous  Changes in  Tastes: A  Philosophical Discussion,  in DECISION  THEORY
AND  SOCIAL  ETHICS: ISSUES  IN  SOCIAL  CHOICE 59 (H.  Gottinger & W.  Leinfellner  eds.  1978).
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with Pareto efficiency,  Le., into a position where  to be efficient is to be
irrational and to be irrational is to be efficient  ....  The disadvantage,
for an economic  unit, of having endogenously  changing tastes is that,
even with perfect information  and perfect  foresight, the unit may find
itself forced to follow  an action which, by the unit's own standards, is
Pareto-dominated. 19
Because  of the  effect  of  consumption,  over  time,  on  preferences,
someone  who  is addicted  to  heroin is  much worse  off even though  the
original  decision to consume  was not irrational if one  looks only  at im-
mediate costs  and  benefits.  Statutes  that regulate  addictive  substances
respond  to  a  social  belief  that  the  relevant  preferences  should  not  be
formed  in the first place.
We might describe  this situation  as involving an intrapersonal  col-
lective action problem,20  in which the costs and benefits,  within a partic-
ular person, of engaging  in the relevant activity change dramatically over
time.  Related  phenomena  were of course  an important part of classical
philosophy, particularly in the treatment of the problems of myopia and
akrasia.  A central point is that consumption patterns induce a significant
change  in preferences,  and in  a way that makes people  worse  off in the
long-run.21  An addiction is the most obvious case, but it is part of a far
broader  category.  Consider, for example,  myopic behavior, defined as a
refusal-because  the short-term costs exceed the short-term  benefits-to
engage in  activity having long-term benefits  that dwarf long-term  costs.
Another kind of intrapersonal  collective  action problem  is produced  by
habits,  in  which  people  engage  in  behavior  because  of the  subjectively
high short-term costs of changing their behavior notwithstanding the fact
that  the long-term  benefits  exceed  the  short-term  benefits.  Akrasia,  or
weakness of the will, has a related structure, and some laws respond to its
individual or collective  forms.
For the most part,  problems of this  sort are best  addressed  at  the
individual  level  or through  private  associations,  which  minimize  coer-
cion; but social regulation is a possible response.  Statutes that subsidize
the arts or public broadcasting, or that discourage the formation of some
habits  and encourage the  formation  of others, are  illustrations.  So  too
with legal requirements that manufacturers  install seat belts or that peo-
ple  buckle them.  The  subjective  costs  of buckling  decrease  over  time.
19.  Id. at 82.
20.  Elster, Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider  Problem, 1 ECON.  & PHIL. 231 (1985);  Schel-
ling, Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 AM.  ECON.  REv.  290  (1978).
21.  Of course all consumption has an effect on preferences.  For example, exposure to classical
music usually increases  appreciation.  But the pattern under discussion is a rare one; it is that pat-
tern, producing  miserable lives, to which  a democracy might respond.  To  be sure,  in practice the
response might make things  worse rather than better.
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Once people are in the habit of buckling, the costs become minimal.  The
fact that the costs shrink rapidly  after the habit of buckling  has formed
counts  in favor of regulation, certainly on welfare  grounds, and perhaps
on autonomy  grounds as well.  There is a similar argument  for compul-
sory  recycling  programs  and  for  democratic  restrictions  on  smoking
cigarettes.
22
The problem with collective controls in this context is that they are
unlikely  to be fine-tuned;  they  often will  sweep up so  many people and
circumstances  as to create serious risks of abuse.  In some settings, how-
ever,  citizens  will be  able  to say  with confidence  that the effect  of con-
sumption  on preferences  will lead to  severe welfare or autonomy losses.
In  such cases democratic  controls are justified.
III.  EXAMPLES:  OVERRIDING  PREFERENCES  IN  A
DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC
A.  Government and the Airwaves
There  is a growing consensus  that the government should  not con-
cern  itself with the airwaves  and that total  reliance on private  markets
and consumer preferences is the appropriate strategy for government.  In
this  view,  broadcasting  should  be  treated  like  soap,  or  cereal,  or any
other commodity.  Indeed, there is a growing consensus that this result is
ordained by the first amendment.  If the claims made here are persuasive,
however, the consensus  is misguided.
The consequence of market-based  strategies in broadcasting is a sys-
tem  in  which  most  viewers  see  shows  that  deal  rarely  with  serious
problems; are frequently  sensationalistic,  prurient, dehumanizing,  or ba-
nal;  reflect  and  perpetuate  a bland,  watered-down  version  of the most
conventional views about politics and morality; are influenced excessively
by  the concerns  of advertisers;  and often  are riddled with violence,  sex-
ism, and racism.  It simply defies belief to suggest that such shows do not
affect the beliefs and even the character of the citizenry. Is it so clear that
a  constitutional  democracy  ought  to  consider  itself  disabled  from  re-
sponding to this situation?  Is it so clear that a first amendment enacted
in order  to ensure  democratic  self-determination bars a democratic  cor-
rective  here?
In my view,  the considerations marshaled thus far suggest that citi-
zens in a constitutional democracy ought to be conceded  the power, and
ought to exercise the power, to engage in a wide range of controls.  These
22.  See  R.  GOODIN,  No  SMOKING:  THE ETHICAL  ISSUEs (1989).
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include the power to regulate advertising on television, certainly for chil-
dren, but  for others as  well;  to require broadcasters  to pay attention  to
public affairs,  as  in, for  example,  an hour  of compulsory  programming
per night;  to ban gratuitous or prurient violence on television,  especially
when it is sexualized; to require, as a condition for licensing, a subsidy to
public television; and to impose a broad fairness doctrine, in the form not
only of an obligation of attention to important issues but also a chance to
speak for divergent sides.  There would be a wide range of collective and
external benefits from such controls, which would thus carry forward  a
strand  of the liberal  tradition that  calls  for  government  action  in such
cases.
2 3
At least in principle, rights of private access to the media for differ-
ing positions ought to be thought congenial to the free speech guarantee.
Surely this is so if that guarantee is understood as a protection of a delib-
erative process centered on public values rather than of a mere "market-
place."  The first  amendment  should not be seen as an obstacle to such
efforts.  If anything, the existing system might be thought to raise serious
constitutional  questions.  A  system  in which  access  to  the media,  with
inevitable  consequences  for  the  shaping  of  preferences  and  beliefs,  is
made  dependent  on private  willingness  to pay  raises  genuine  problems
for free expression.
24
B.  Proportional  Representation
In recent  years,  there has been  a revival  of interest  in systems  of
proportional or group representation.  Blacks, women, the handicapped,
and other disadvantaged groups often have had little success in the ordi-
nary electoral process.  There is a solid constitutional pedigree for group
representation, notwithstanding  the constant and emphatic rejections by
the  Supreme  Court of constitutionally-based  arguments  for  representa-
tion of members  of racial  minority  groups.  Despite the  rigidity  of the
"one  person, one vote"  formula, with its majoritarian and individualistic
overtones, group representation  always  has been an important  feature of
American constitutionalism.
25
Moreover, the basic constitutional institutions of federalism, bicam-
23.  See,  e.g.,  J. MILL,  PRINCIPLES OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  (1871).
24.  The Supreme  Court seemed to recognize  this point in Red  Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395  U.S.  367  (1969),  but  the point  has dropped out of the current debate.
25.  At the time of the framing,  for example, geography  was thought to define distinct commu-
nities with distinct  interests; representation  of the states as such seemed  only natural.  It  would not
be impossible to argue that racial  and ethnic groups  (among others) are the contemporary  analogue
to groups that were defined  in geographical  terms during the  founding period.
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eralism,  and  checks  and balances,  share  some of the appeal  of propor-
tional representation,  and owe their  origins  in part to notions  of group
representation.  These institutions  proliferate the points of access to gov-
ernment, increasing the ability of diverse groups to influence policy, mul-
tiplying  perspectives  in  government,  and  improving  deliberative
capacities.  In  this respect,  they ensure  something in  the way  of group
representation, at least when compared  with unitary systems.  Of course
both the separation  of powers and bicameralism  grow  in part out of ef-
forts to promote representation  of diverse groups:  bicameralism allowed
representation  of the wealthy  and the masses;  the notion of separation
derived from notions of mixed government,  which  was designed  to en-
sure  a  measure  of representation  of groups  defined  in  social  and  eco-
nomic terms.
Proportional  representation might be designed to ensure representa-
tion in  the legislature  of all groups  able to attain more than a  minimal
share of the vote.  In another form, the system  might be designed to en-
sure that members of disadvantaged  groups are given the power to exert
influence on political outcomes.
There are serious problems with both of these efforts, and  I do not
mean  to evaluate  them in detail here.  I do suggest that efforts to ensure
proportional  representation become much more plausible  if they are jus-
tified on grounds that do not take preferences as given and if they empha-
size  the  preference-shaping  effects  of  discussion  and  disagreement  in
politics.2 6  The  argument here is that deliberative  processes  will be im-
proved, not undermined, if mechanisms are instituted to ensure that mul-
tiple groups have access to the process.  Group representation,  precisely
by having this effect, would ensure that diverse views are expressed on an
ongoing  basis in the representative  process,  where they might otherwise
be  excluded.  In  this  respect,  group  representation  would  be  a kind  of
second-best  solution  for the  real-world failures  of Madisonian  delibera-
tion.  And the purpose of access is not primarily  to allow each group to
have its "piece of the action"-though that is not entirely irrelevant-but
instead to ensure that the process of deliberation  is not distorted by the
mistaken appearance of a common set of interests on the part of all con-
cerned.  In  this  incarnation,  proportional  representation  is  designed  to
increase the likelihood that political outcomes  will incorporate some un-
derstanding of the perspectives of all those affected.  That process should
26.  In part this is Mill's defense of such efforts.  See J. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS  ON REPRESEN-
TATIVE GOVERNMENT,  supra note 5.  See also Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique  of the
Ideal of Universal  Citizenship, 99 ETHics  250 (1989).CHICAGO-KENT  LAW  REVIEW
facilitate the healthy expression of collective values or aspirations and the
scrutiny of preferences adaptive to unjust background conditions or lim-
ited opportunities.
For this reason, proportional representation  may be the  functional
analogue of the institutions of checks and balances and federalism, recog-
nizing  the creative  functions  of disagreement  and multiple  perspectives
for the governmental  process.  In this sense there  is continuity  between
recent proposals  for proportional representation and some of the attrac-
tive features of the original constitutional regime. Indeed, Hamilton him-
self emphasized that in a system of checks and balances, the  "jarring of
parties...  [will] promote deliberation. '27  If this is so, proportional rep-
resentation  is  most  understandable  in  a democracy  that  does  not  take
preferences  as  given.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Much of the appeal of the republican  tradition  lies  in its emphasis
on a conception of political life that does not treat private preferences as
the  foundation  of social  choice.  Those  who partake  of the republican
tradition-for  these  purposes,  a  capacious  category  including  writers
from Aristotle to Rawls-insist that political institutions have inevitable
consequences  for  preferences  and beliefs.  A  large task of constitutional
design, and for the development of legal rules in general,  is to ensure that
those  consequences  are favorable rather than unfavorable.
To say this is not at all to suggest that a republican polity ought to
impose  on its  citizens  a unitary  conception  of the good.  A  general re-
spect  for  diversity  in individual  choice  is  indispensable  in modern  sys-
tems.  Such  respect  does  not,  however,  entail  protection  for  existing
preferences,  regardless of their origins or consequences, or of the reasons
that might be offered  in their behalf.
I have suggested that the classical tradition continues to provide gui-
dance for those interested in the evaluation of preferences and beliefs and
in the connections between these and existing institutional arrangements.
Above all, perhaps, the classical tradition suggests reasons not to tolerate
a system without property rights or containing systemic poverty.  A sys-
tem without property, or with property, has stultifying effects on the free
development  of personality  and simultaneously  poses a threat to the  in-
dependence  and security of its people, which are prerequisites for repub-
lican  citizenship.  But  the  classical  tradition  also  suggests  the need  to
27.  THE FEDERALIST  No.  70, at 427 (A.  Hamilton)(C.  Rossiter  ed.  1961).
[Vol.  66:1811990] REPUBLICANISM  AND  PREFERENCE  PROBLEM
respect  collective  aspirations,  to  respond  to  preferences  and  beliefs
formed by unjust  background  institutions, and to overcome the sorts  of
intrapersonal collective action problems manifested  in addiction, myopic
behavior, and akrasia.
To warrant respect, such a system should be liberal as well  as repub-
lican.  Indeed, it should  see  its liberalism  as operating  in close  alliance
with its republicanism.  To say that preferences ought not always be the
basis of social choice is hardly  to say that collectivities generally  should
override individual  choices.  It is, however, to say that government can-
not  avoid  the task  of allocating  rights  and entitlements  in the first  in-
stance,  that  existing  institutions  and  allocations  will  inevitably  affect
preferences  and beliefs,  and that a political  system  ought to attempt to
ensure  that preferences  will be  formed  and expressed  under conditions
that promote rather than undermine  liberty and welfare, and that reflect
the diverse social goods that  lie underneath both of these, properly con-
ceived.  It is on this issue, perhaps above all, that the republican tradition
has much to  offer contemporary  legal  and political thought.